



**SecureGas**  
Securing the European Gas Network




SecureGas project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement No 833017

# SecureGas numbers and consortium

<b>Project Title:</b>	<b>Securing the European Gas Network</b>
<b>GA number</b>	833017
<b>Starting date</b>	1 June 2019 (M1)
<b>Ending Date</b>	30 Nov 2021 (M30)
<b>Budget info</b>	9.194.410,60 € (cost) 6.993.400,75 € (funding)
<b>Partners</b>	21 partners


## SECUREGAS COORDINATOR:



## SECUREGAS PARTNERS:



# Context: Critical Infrastructure



*Critical infrastructure is an asset or system which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions.*

The damage to a critical infrastructure, its destruction .... may have a significant negative impact for the security of the EU and the well-being of its citizens. [EU COM 114/2008 ]

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. NASA Science News. Severe Space Weather – Social and Economic Impacts, June 2009 at [http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2009/21jan\\_severespaceweather/](http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2009/21jan_severespaceweather/)

# Context: Physical Incidents


A total of **1366 incidents** to gas network reported from **1970-2016**

## Main causes:

- A. External interference (TPI)** (e.g. digging, piling or ground works by heavy machinery)
- B. Corrosion**
- C. Ground movement** (dike break, mining)

***SecureGas addresses A) and C) as well as man-made/terrorist threats***


## Gas pipelines incidents



Gas pipeline incidents, 10-th report of the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG) <https://www.egig.eu/reports>; <https://www.egig.eu/overview>

# Context: Cyber Threats

- The **number of incidents** reported so far is **less** if compared to the physical ones ....
- Whilst the impact (**financial damage**) is **high**
  - Global figures estimate that cybersecurity breaches in oil and gas and power cost operators \$1,87 billion up to 2018
- The main cyber issues addressed by SecureGas are cyber attacks on OT network of SCADA systems
- ***The protection of ICS/SCADA networks is a cross sectorial solution for any critical infrastructure***





[https://www.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/Annual\\_Reports/FY2016\\_Industrial\\_Control\\_Systems\\_Assessment\\_Summary\\_Report\\_S5o8C.pdf](https://www.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Reports/FY2016_Industrial_Control_Systems_Assessment_Summary_Report_S5o8C.pdf)

# SecureGas idea: from Resilience of CI... to «Resilience Management» of CI... incorporating cascading effects

Providing “resilience” for Critical Infrastructure means to estimate the impact of loss of functionalities on the business and service continuity

Linking **Resilience Capabilities** (Plan/Prepare, Detect, Absorb, Recover, Adapt) to the **Disaster Management Cycle** (Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery) and then embedding them into an **Asset Management Process**.


Providing “resilience” means **not only to secure the specific infrastructure but also to understand and estimate the potential cascading effects** induced by the loss of functionalities of one infrastructure on the others



Italy's Gas supply limited by explosion at gas plant in Austria 2017

# SecureGas Focus: EU Gas Network

MAIN GAS TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE IN EUROPE<sup>(\*)</sup>



SecureGas focuses on key elements (e.g. installations, pipelines) of the +140.000 Km of the **European Gas network** from Production to Transmission up to Distribution

... In 3 specific targeted areas:

- 1) Greece
- 2) Lithuania (Baltic states)
- 3) Italy

End Users:



# SecureGas Overall Objective

To increase the **SECURITY & RESILIENCE** of the EU Gas Critical Infrastructure (e.g. network and installations), by taking into account both physical and cyber threats, as well as and their combination.

## NATURAL EVENTS



ANSA.it - ANSA English - News

SMS NEWSMAP

### Genoa's gas supply cut off by landslide

Prosecutors open probe after pipeline cut

21 March, 16:12

8+1

Indietro | Stampa | Invia | Scrivi alla redazione | Suggestisci

(ANSA) - Genoa, March 21 - Public Prosecutor Alberto Landolfi opened an investigation Friday into a landslide that cut off Genoa's gas supply.

Residents of Genoa and 15 surrounding communities were ordered to stop using gas on Thursday after a landslide broke a gas pipeline in Serra Riccio.

Landolfi's probe aims to find responsibility for the disaster. Residents were still without gas on Friday as technicians from gas service provider Snam worked to repair the pipeline.



1 di 1

Guarda la foto

## MAN-MADE ACCIDENTS

### Explosion Sabotages Turkish Pipeline Carrying Natural Gas from Iran

By Joao Peixe - Oct 20, 2012, 7:00 PM CDT

Less than a week ago gas began to flow again through a Turkish pipeline carrying Iranian natural gas following an attack that had disrupted supplies. Now Turkish officials are once again reporting that saboteurs have bombed the pipe, halting the flow of natural gas and injuring 28 soldiers.

The Turkish pipeline operator Botas has already asked to Gazprom to send more gas to cover for the loss of gas coming from Iran. Gazprom will increase its supply through the Blue Stream underwater pipeline from 32 million cubic metres a day to 48 million.

Taner Yildiz, the Turkish Energy Minister, has assured Reuters that "despite the cut in the gas flow, there is no problem in meeting natural gas demand."

Related Article: [Turkey-Syria on the Brink of War](#)

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has claimed responsibility for countless attacks against Turkish pipelines during its 28 year campaign to achieve self-governance for the Kurdish region of Turkey. In recent months the attacks have increased, and oil flow has been disrupted several times through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline.

## CYBER ATTACKS



Official website of the Department of Homeland Security



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[National Cyber Awareness System](#) > [Alerts](#) > Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations

### Alert (AA20-049A)

#### Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations

Original release date: February 18, 2020

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




# Validated in 3 Business Cases

**BC3:** Operationalising cyber-physical resilience for the security and asset integrity of strategic gas installation.

It addresses Production and Transportation (**Upstream to Midstream**) with particular emphasis on import pipelines and connections with National Grids.



**BC1:** Risk-based security asset life-cycle management.

Transportation and Distribution (**Midstream up to Downstream**) of Gas at strategic (project planning), tactical (project risk assessment) and operational (Distribution Network) level


**BC2:** Impact and cascading effect of cyber-physical attack.

Transportation network (**midstream**) with particular emphasis to vital nodes of the network, that if damaged could cause significant disruptions and cascading effects to interconnected (energy) infrastructures

SecureGas adopts a Business Case driven approach across the whole Gas supply chain from Production to Marketing, from Upstream to Downstream




# Key features & Service Offering





# SecureGas extended components




## SecureGas Components




# Conceptual Model



- Gas Infrastructure abstracted as networks where resources flow from one node to the other
- For each node and link main risks assessed and KPIs assigned
- KPIs constantly monitored to determine the global performance of the network and adjust its response on events



# High-Level Reference Architecture



- SecureGas Services provided via a Platform as a Service (PaaS)
- Sub-Task 3.6.2 High level Integration & Interop. (RINA)
- Sub-Task 3.1.1 Safety & Security Platform for Gas CI (LDO)
- Sub-Task 3.2.2 Blockchain for data transmission and integrity verification mechanisms (GT)
- 1) Sub-Task 3.4.1 Joint Cyber-Physical Security Risk and Resilience Modelling (RTU, FHG)
- 2) Sub-Task 3.4.2 Joint Cyber-Physical Risk and Resilience Management (FHG)
- 3) Sub-Task 3.4.3 Gas Network Advanced Modelling and Fast-Dynamics Simulation (FHG)
- Sub-Task 3.2.1 Data Analytics and Machine Learning for cyber-physical anomaly detection (WINGS)
- 1) Sub-Task 3.1.2 Autonomous docking station and UAV-based asset management (ADPM)
- 2) Sub-Task 3.3.2 Cognitive framework for biometrics and video analytics (IDMG)
- Sub-Task 3.6.1 Low level Integration & Interop. (RINA)
- OT/SCADA Network Security (LDO)
- E-VPMS (ENI)
- Fiber Optic, DAS (ENI, RINA)

A reference framework for the implementation, integration and interoperability of SecureGas components



# Platform as a Service (PaaS)

- The service is aimed at providing the means for the overall management of Oil&Gas infrastructures.
- It exploits the SecureGas High Level Reference Architecture (HLRA).
- RINA CUBE can encompass the top layer of the HLRA and collect all of its feedback and correlate its different feature and highlight threat patterns.
- This allows End-Users to find causality relationships where there might not be an apparent one and help in the definition and implementation of remedial security and safety measures.
- Furthermore RINA CUBE will facilitate the communication with the authorities and provide the means for the correct management of security and safety related matters both in the planning and the aftermath of an event.

Digital platform of platforms



**CUBE**

Digital platform of platforms



# Business Case 1 Components

## COGNITIVE FRAMEWORK FOR BIOMETRICS AND VIDEO ANALYTICS

Identify malicious physical presence near critical gas infrastructures and suspicious objects detected from the cameras and input sensors within or near the CIs.

## CYBER PHYSICAL CORRELATOR


A Machine Learning based tool for advanced event processing to monitor the resources of the SecureGas platform, as well as different components, aggregating the information in order to detect threats.

## RISK AWARE INFORMATION TO THE POPULATION

Enable Gas CI operators to (efficiently) notify authorities (civil protection, first responders, other CI operators) on an emergency.

## JOINT CYBER-PHYSICAL RISK & RESILIENCE MANAGEMENT

Enhance the security and resilience of gas CI networks, covering the main principles imposed by Resilience and Disaster Risk Management Cycle.



# Business Case 2 Components

## RESILIENCE OF THE IT/OT NETWORKS

Improving security weaknesses in interface points between IT and OT networks (e.g. hacked/infected control server issuing fault/non reliable commands via OT (SCADA) protocol, fault information report).

## GAS NETWORK MODELLING AND SIMULATIONS


Modelling and simulation of coupled gas grids, combining the already available modelling techniques with a thorough inclusion of quantitative response and recovery models.

## UAVs FOR LEAKS DETECTION

Application of UAVs for leaks detection of buried pipelines and decision support to the operator.

## JOINT CYBER-PHYSICAL RISK & RESILIENCE MANAGEMENT

Enhance the security and resilience of gas CI networks, covering the main principles imposed by Resilience and Disaster Risk Management Cycle.





# Business Case 3 Components

## THIRD PARTY INTERFERENCE AND LEAKS DETECTION

Leaks detection, due to TPI and external sources via Distributed Fiber Optics and Vibroacoustic sensors.

## RESILIENCE OF THE OT/IT NETWORK


Protection from «Man in the Middle Attack» to SCADA system by means of components that protect the SCADA network.

## ACQUIRE AND GEO-REFERENCE ANY CHANGES

Patrolling via UAVs, programmable on demand by the operator and triggered by the leaks or intrusion detections.


## MONITORING AND EARLY WARNING OF LANDSLIDES

Hazard mapping and an early warning alert system for rainfall-induced landslides, specifically tailored to onshore linear infrastructures such.



# SecureGas stakeholders

- **GAS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (CI) OWNERS AND OPERATORS**
  - Transmission System Operators (TSOs)
  - Distributor System Operators (DSOs)
- **ENERGY COMPANIES**
  - Any company in the sector that needs to protect and made resilience its assets (e.g. refineries, platforms) against cyber and physical threats, natural events.
- **ASSOCIATIONS IN THE GAS SECTOR AND BEYOND** (e.g. GIE, ENTSOG, GCG, ReCO system for Gas)
- **PUBLIC AUTHORITIES** (e.g. Ministries of Interior / Infrastructure / Development, Police, FireBrigade, Civil Protection, Energy Regulatory Authorities, etc.)
- **EUROPEAN DIRECTORATE GENERALS** (DG-HOME, DG-ENER, DG-ECHO, DG-CONNECT)



# SecureGas opportunities for replication

## ■ SECUREGAS IS BUSINESS CASE DRIVEN

- Business Cases have been designed by the O&G companies in the consortium. This ensures that requirements, specifications, architecture and components are highly applicable and replicable in the O&G sector domain for Security & Resilience purposes.
- SecureGas has been conceived as a modular solution that can fit needs of small and very large (Oil &) Gas operators (from O&G corporations and Energy company, to local distributors) across the whole supply chain (from upstream to downstream).
- All SecureGas components address a wide range of cyber-physical threats.
- A subset of SecureGas components addresses specific issues identified in the 3 business cases and it is validated against SotA solutions and KPIs defined by the Business Cases Owners (e.g. the O&G companies in the consortium).


# SecureGas contribution to the policy context

- A. SecureGas frames the “**regulatory context**” of Security & Resilience for Gas CI in Deliverable **D1.1 Organisational, Operational and Regulatory requirements**”
- B. SecureGas **Business Cases** have been **designed to address** specific issues highlighted in the **EU Regulation 2017/1938 on Security of Gas Supply as well as the EU Directive on Critical Infrastructure Protection** (Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008)
- C. SecureGas will deliver a **White paper “Lessons learnt and recommendations for cyber-physical resilience of European Gas Critical Infrastructure”**
- D. SecureGas will deliver **guidelines for standards addressing convergence of Safety and Security** approaches as well as improved certification mechanisms surrounding the future standards proposals

# Implementation status

User, Operational and Legislative Requirements	D1.1	PU
Technical and Standard related Requirements	D1.2	CO
<b>Risks, Threats and Vulnerabilities</b>	D1.3	EU-RES
<b>KPIs Inventory</b>	D1.4	PU
First Release of the Conceptual Model (CM)	D2.1	PU
A set of Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) for the implementation of the CM	D2.1	PU
First Release of the SecureGas High-Level Reference Architecture	D2.3	PU
Ethical & Legal Monitoring Plan	D9.1	PU
Data Management Plan	D9.3	PU
Communication and dissemination strategy	D8.3	PU
<b>A set of scenarios and related uses cases for the 3 Business Cases</b>	D4.1 D5.1 D6.1	EU-RES

Until May (M12), **the project has delivered:**



# User and technical requirements


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1

Past EC-funded projects  
Academic Publications

2

Focus Groups  
Semi-structured interviews  
Questionnaires



4

External End-Users & Stakeholders  
Validation Workshop  
September 2019

# Risks, Threats and Vulnerabilities for Gas CI

**Political  
Geo-political  
Social**

*(War/Civil War, Protests  
, Invasion)*

**Explosion**  
*(Man, Vehicle,  
Kamikazes)*

**Chemical /  
Biological  
Radiological /  
Nuclear**

**Criminal**  
*(Vandalism, Personnel  
attack, Thefts)*

**Cyber Threats**

*(DoS, Physical  
manipulation, SCADA)*

**Critical  
Utilities  
Failures**

*(Power,  
cooling/heating,  
emergency)*

**Ground Works**  
*(External contractors  
machinery, excavation,  
digging)*

**Natural**  
*(Land slide, Fire,  
Lighting)*


**Operational**  
*(Material Failures,  
Installation,  
Maintenance)*

**Technical**  
*(Corrosion, Mechanical  
Impacts, Design/  
Planning error)*

**Indirect threats**  
*(Aviation / Maritime /  
Vehicle / Rail accidents)*

**Hardware  
Vulnerabilities**  
*(Equipment failure /  
Vulnerability /  
Misuse)*

# Key Performance Indicators



SecureGas Cross-KPIs	
Field	Indicator
Reliability	False alert rate
	Cross correlation
	Latency
	Mean time to report
Autonomy	Threat categories addressed
	Automatic detection of threats
	Automatic decision-support
	Alert criticality
Interoperability	Transparent integration of users' legacy systems
Usability	Multilingual Interface
Resilience	Self testing capabilities (system health check)




# Scenarios and related uses cases

- Unauthorized physical access
- Intrusion and Manual modification of valves configuration
- (Vehicle) explosive device
- Remote control deployment of valves
- Manual sabotage with cyberattack masking (signal tampering)
- Physical-cyber-physical/ «Man-in-the-Middle» attack to the SCADA system
- Methane leak detection by Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
- Third Party Interference enhancement



# Implementation status





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