



SAFEguard of Critical heAlth infrastructure

SAFECARE Project

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HORIZON 2020

Slide 1

Please add your logo here Elodie Reuge; 03/02/2020 ER1

Challenge for health systems managers

- 3 perimeters that overlap and collaborate:
 - Medical devices
 - Building management
 - Medical data and software
- Polymorphic, agile, and combined threats: today and tomorrow, a strong attraction for cybercriminals and terrorists
- A strong dependence between assets and complex impact chains... that can affect the lives of patients and staff
- Paradoxically: A lot of information in specialized supervision systems without communication or integration

Need for a global vision in anticipation, protection, and crisis management



Addressing the challenge...

SAFECARE aims to:

- Provide high-quality, innovative, and cost-effective solutions that will improve physical and cyber security; and
- Enhance threat prevention, threat detection, incident response, and mitigation of impact in healthcare infrastructures, through the creation of a global protection system.

Over the course of 36 months, SAFECARE will design, test, validate and demonstrate 13 innovative elements optimizing the protection of critical infrastructure under operational conditions



Project Identity

| GA Number | 787002 |
|---|--|
| Starting date | 01/09/2018 |
| Duration in months | 36 |
| Topic | CIP-01-2016-2017 |
| Consortium | 21 partners - 10 EU countries Technical providers, hospitals, national public health agencies and security bodies |
| Project Coordinator: Technical coordinator: Scientific coordinator: | Philippe Tourron, Marseille Public University Hospital (AP-HM) David Lancelin, Airbus CyberSecurity (CCS) Isabel Praça, Instituto Superior de Engenharia do Porto (ISEP) |























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





Four steps to manage the security







High Level Architecture




Scenarios and risk assessment

Scenarios



- Sc1: Cyber-physical attack targeting **power supply** of the hospital
- Sc2: Cyber-physical attack to steal patient data in the hospital
- Sc3: Cyber-physical attack targeting IT systems
- Sc4: Cyber-physical attack to cause a hardware fault
- Sc5: Cyber-physical attack targeting the air-cooling system of the hospital
- Sc6: Cyber-physical attack on medical devices
- Sc7: Cyber-physical attack to **steal credentials** to access IT systems
- Sc8: Cyber-Physical attack in access control provider to steal medical devices
- Sc9: Physical attack against hospital staff using a gun
- Sc10: Physical attack to steal drugs
- Sc11: Cyber-physical attack due to a **personal laptop**
- Sc12: Cyber-physical attack to block national crisis management

Risk Assessment



Scenarios Definition



RISK OPPONENT STA INTE









Risk Assessment





Risk Assessment

Combined with BowTie




Business values (critical or primary assets)

| Hospital Missions | Caring for patients | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------------------------------|---|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|
| Business values (Critical Assets) | Patient care data management | Patient health data | Administrative management of patient data | Guarantee the safety of the building and people | Receive patients 24/7/365 | Perform care | Crisis management | | |
| Nature of critical assets (process or information) | Process | Information | Process | Process | Process | Process | Process | | |
| Description | Processing of patient data | Patient health data and administrative data | All the management necessary for the localisation, billing, patient identity and communication | Safe reception of patients, staff and visitors | Physical or telephone reception of patients. Emergency Medical Services. All services with a patient reception and offices dedicated to patient registration | Support for the patient, at all step of their care process (Nursing care, care unit, surgical procedures, psychological support, medical imaging, biological analyses) | Organisational and technical procedure during a health / humanitarian crisis (France : Orsan Plan) | | |
| Responsible entity or person | Health care facility | Health care facility | Health care facility | Health care facility | Health care facility | Health care facility | Health care facility | | |

What appens during or at the end of the kill chain?



Physical Security Solutions





Physical Security Solutions










Physical Security Solutions


Integrated mobile alerting system







Cyber Security Solutions



Cyber Security Solutions


E-health device security analytics

- Source event: E-health devices security analytics
- Event to incident path:
 - **1. Sender:** E-health devices security analytics
 - 2. Receiver/forwarder: syslog-ng server
 - **3. Collector & correlator (event → alert):** Graylog
 - **4. SOAR (alert → incident):** Cymerius




Cyber Security Solutions

Cyber Threat Monitoring System




High Level Architecture






Integrated Solutions



Integrated Solutions




End-Users Training

- Training process (plan; prepare; facilitate and; evaluate)
- E-learning platform, based on LMCS Moodle, called Smart Life Long Learning (Smart3L)
- * Planning training process (user-groups; training goal and objectives; training framework; training modules and content; training methods and delivery tools; evaluation methodology)





Simulation and Tests Platform



Tests and Demonstration


Test Platform



Pilots



Marseille



Turin





Amsterdam

Thank you!

Questions?

SAF ZARE
integrated cyber physical security for health services

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